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Wanted: A Bigger Stick. On Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts with Online Service 
Providers 
 
Abstract 
The Unfair Contract Terms Directive (the "Directive" or the "UCTD") offers consumers 
protection from pre-formulated imbalanced contract terms. While the standard terms and 
conditions of online service providers have previously been accused of harming clients of 
such online services, a comprehensive analysis of the potential unfair character of such terms 
and conditions in line with the interpretation of the Directive supplied by the CJEU has not 
yet been provided. This paper aims to fill in this gap in the academic literature. It identifies 
several types of contractual terms used by international online service providers in their 
consumer contracts, which are unlikely to pass the Directive's unfairness test. 
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1. Introduction 
The Unfair Contract Terms Directive1 (the “Directive” or the “UCTD”) offers consumers 
protection from pre-formulated imbalanced contract terms (Tenreiro 1995, pp. 278-279). 
According to the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “CJEU”), the Directive’s 
system of protection assumes that the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis the trader as 
regards both her bargaining power and her level of knowledge. This often leads to the 
consumer agreeing to terms drawn up in advance by the seller or supplier without being able 
to influence the content of such terms (Micklitz 2010, pp. 360-361).2 The Directive aims to 
provide for a mechanism ensuring that every contractual term that is not individually 
negotiated may be reviewed in order to determine whether it is unfair (Tenreiro 1995, pp. 
275-276).3 The standard terms and conditions used by online service providers have 
                                                 
1 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ 1993, L 095/29. 
2 See for instance: CJEU 4 June 2009, case C-243/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:350 (Pannon), point 22; CJEU 26 April 
2012, case C-472/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:242 (NFH/Invitel), point 33; CJEU 21 March 2013, case C-92/11, 
ECLI:C:EU:2013:180 (RWE Vertrieb AG/Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV), point 41; CJEU 30 
April 2014, case C-26/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:282 (Kásler and Káslerné Rábai/OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt), point 39. 
3 CJEU 21 March 2013, case C-92/11, ECLI:C:EU:2013:180 (RWE Vertrieb AG/Verbraucherzentrale 
Nordrhein-Westfalen eV), point 42; CJEU 30 April 2014, case C-26/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:282 (Kásler and 
Káslerné Rábai/OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt), point 40. 
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previously been accused of harming clients of such online services (Bradshaw et al. 2011; 
Rustad & Onufrio 2012; Wauters, Lievens et al. 2014). However, to our best knowledge a 
comprehensive analysis of the potential unfair character of such terms and conditions in line 
with the interpretation of the Directive supplied by the CJEU has not yet been provided.4 This 
paper aims to fill in this gap in the academic literature. This paper, therefore, does not 
challenge the concepts of the Directive, but rather extensively exposes terms and conditions 
of selected online service providers as not complying with existing European legislation. 
Such terms and conditions could, therefore, be contested in more than one Member State. In 
our opinion, a co-ordinated cross-border enforcement could motivate online service providers 
to change their policies. 
 
We have examined various documents available online to clients of such international 
online service providers like Google,5 Twitter,6 Facebook,7 and Dropbox8 and identified a 
number of contractual terms that could be submitted to the unfairness test. We have chosen as 
our subjects these particular online service providers, as they operate throughout the 
European Union and, therefore, their contract terms should be compliant with applicable 
European laws. Moreover, they represent various sectors of online services, from e-mail 
service providers and social networks to cloud-based storage service providers. This allows 
us to examine whether there is any distinction in the exhibited compliance standard 
depending on which sector of online services a given service provider is active in. Previous 
studies of standard contract terms and conditions of online service providers (Bradshaw et al. 
2011; Wauters, Lievens et al. 2014) did not focus on evaluating the possibility of unfairness 
of such terms and, therefore, our paper reveals new arguments that could be raised to claim 
unenforceability of such clauses. 
                                                 
4 Bradshaw et al. 2011 focus on the specifics of cloud computing contracts; Wauters, Lievens et al. 2014 
specifically target networking sites. Finally, Rustad & Onufrio 2012, who scrutinize the standard terms and 
conditions of several US online service providers, approach the matter more from the point of view of US 
companies having to adapt their standard terms and conditions in order to safely export consumer information 
products to Europe (and elsewhere). 
5 Google Terms of Service are available online at https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/regional.html 
(last visited on 7 August 2015). According to this website, Google Terms of Service have last been amended on 
30 April 2014. 
6 Twitter’s Terms of Service are available online at https://twitter.com/tos (last visited on 7 August 2015). 
According to this website, the Terms of Service is effective as of 18 May 2015. 
7 Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities are available online at https://en-
gb.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited on 7 August 2015). According to a posting on its Site Governance 
website (available at https://www.facebook.com/fbsitegovernance, last visited on 7 August 2015), the last 
changes to Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities have taken effect on 30 January 2015. 
8 Dropbox Terms of Service are available online at https://www.dropbox.com/terms?view_en#terms (last visited 
on 7 August 2015). According to this website, the Terms of Service have been posted on 1 May 2015 . 
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The following sections first address the issue of the Directive’s applicability to standard 
terms and conditions of online service providers (section 2). Thereafter we discuss various 
types of contractual terms that could be contested by clients of these online service providers 
as well as by consumer organizations with regard to their compliance with the Directive.9 We 
evaluate contractual terms that allow for unilateral changes of other contractual terms (section 
3) or of the service itself (section 4); terms that allow for unilateral termination of the contract 
by the online service provider (section 5); exclusions or limitations of liability (section 6); 
international jurisdiction clauses (section 7); and choice-of-law clauses (section 8). We finish 
our analysis by illustrating the overarching problem of many online contractual terms, 
namely, their lack of transparency (section 9). In this last section, we indicate how the matter 
of transparency of standard terms and conditions may interrelate with questions of 
substantive fairness under EU-law and what, therefore, the consequences may be of a breach 
of the transparency requirement. In our conclusions (section 10), we briefly summarize the 
substantive inadequacies of many online contractual terms, suggesting that enforcement of 
compliance of such terms with European consumer law should be strengthened in the coming 
years to add an incentive for online sellers and service providers to comply with the standards 
for consumer protection set by the European legislator. 
 
2. Application of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to Online Contractual Terms 
The Unfair Contract Terms Directive only applies to contractual terms: Article 2 under (a) of 
the Directive defines “unfair terms” as “the contractual terms defined in Article 3”. The 
Directive does not elaborate on the notion of a “contractual term”. This implies that the term 
must be interpreted autonomously in accordance with the common principles of the Member 
States’ private law systems. In our view, “contractual terms” are terms that confer a right or 
an obligation to one of the parties or otherwise regulate the required behaviour of a party in 
her contractual relationship with the other party. From this it follows that where standard 
terms and conditions of online service providers explicitly state or just imply that they assign 
rights and obligations to the parties they must be classified as contract terms within the 
Directive’s meaning. Such contractual terms may then be tested against the conditions for 
unfairness as set in Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Directive. It provides that a contractual term 
which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the 
                                                 
9 If a consumer organization would want to represent consumers’ interests and argue for an injunction against 
certain unfair contract terms of these online service providers, it would need to be established that at least some 
of the clients of these providers fall within the scope of the “consumer” notion. 
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requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and 
obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.  
 
The reference to contractual terms implies that the Directive can only apply if a contract has 
been concluded between an online seller or supplier and a consumer. Whether this is the case 
is primarily10 a matter of national law. If such is the case, and pursuant to its Article 1, 
paragraph 1, the Directive regulates unfair terms in such contracts. In any case, the Directive 
unequivocally requires that the seller or supplier of online services ‘is acting for purposes 
relating to his trade, business or profession’ (Article 2, under (c), UCTD) and that the user of 
online services is a consumer as identified under Article 2, under (b), UCTD. With regard to 
this requirement we observe that while professional parties dominate the market for provision 
of online services, users of such online services may not always qualify as consumers.  
The notion of a “consumer” refers in European consumer law mostly to a natural 
person concluding a contract for a purpose which falls outside of her trade or profession.11 
Moreover, according to the CJEU’s case-law in matters related to private international law, 
where a natural person acts both for a private and a professional purpose that person can only 
then qualify as a consumer within the meaning of European consumer law when the purpose 
related to that person’s trade or profession would be as small as to be negligible.12 If this 
notion’s narrow scope also applies to substantive European consumer law (Tonner 2014, p. 
397; contrary: Reich, Micklitz 2014, pp. 50-56), then not every user of online services could 
                                                 
10 Though not exclusively, as the effet utile of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive may require the national 
legislator or court to determine, e.g., that for the purposes of that Directive a contract in fact has been concluded 
whereas according to national doctrines of contract law this may not (yet) be the case. This may, for instance, be 
relevant where a legal system requires a counter-performance (however small) to be provided to the online seller 
or supplier in order for there to be a contract. We do not touch any further on this potential problem, since our 
focus lies on the evaluation of the European-wide problems with the application and interpretation of the 
Directive rather than on specific national issues.  
11 See for instance Article 2 under (b) Unfair Contract Terms Directive; Article 2 under (e) Price Indication 
Directive (Directive 98/6/EC, OJ 1998, L 80/27); Article 2 under (1) Consumer Sales Directive (Directive 
1999/44/EC, OJ 1999, L 171/12; Article 2 under (e) E-Commerce Directive (Directive 2000/31/EC, OJ 2000, L 
178/1); Article 2 under (d) Distance Marketing of Financial Services Directive (Directive 2002/65/EC, OJ 2002, 
L 271); Article 2 under (a) Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (Directive 2005/29/EC, OJ 2005, L 149/22); 
Article 3 under (a) Consumer Credit Directive (Directive 2008/48/EC, OJ 2008, L 133/66); Article 2, paragraph 
1, under (f) Timeshare Directive (Directive 2008/122/EC, OJ 2009, L 33/10); Article 2 under (1) Consumer 
Rights Directive (Directive 2011/83/EU, OJ 2011, L 304/64); Article 4 under (1) Mortgage Credit Directive 
(Directive 2014/17/EU, OJ 2014, L 60/34). See also Article 2 under (f) of the proposal for a Regulation on a 
Common European Sales Law (COM(2011) 635 final). The principal exception is Article 2, paragraph 4, of the 
Package Travel Directive (Directive 90/314/EEC, OJ 1990, L 158/59), which definition may include also 
natural persons travelling for business purposes. In the proposal for a new Package Travel Directive 
(COM(2013) 512 final) the notion of ‘ consumer’ is replaced by ‘traveller’, see Article 3 under (6) of the 
proposal. 
12 It may, therefore, also in substantive European consumer law not suffice that the private use is predominant: 
CJEU 20 January 2005, case C-464/01, ECLI:EU:C:2005:32 (Gruber), point 41.  
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be seen as a consumer in European consumer law. Users of cloud-based storage services 
often store their work-related documents online, users of e-mail services send professional 
emails and users of social networks may have either professional accounts separate from their 
personal accounts or use one social network account for both purposes (Wauters, Lievens et 
al. 2014, pp. 19-20). In all these circumstances the national court would need to determine 
whether a particular user of online services could be considered a “consumer” and as such 
could then claim protection against unfair contract terms as granted by the Directive.13 
However, the Consumer Rights Directive, the most recent general measure of European 
consumer law, introduces in its Recital 17 a broader definition of a consumer as a natural 
person who would mainly act for non-professional purposes. Whether such mixed purpose 
contracts could also fall under the scope of consumer protection granted by the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive still needs to be confirmed by the CJEU but it seems likely that this 
would be the case.14 
 
An important question is whether the Directive is applicable to so-called “free” online 
services. It should be remarked that such services in fact are typically not offered for free, but 
rather include hidden charges (Hoofnagle and Whittington 2014, pp. 608-612); instead of 
monetary payment, consumers pay with their personal data, which is collected either 
explicitly through registration forms, tacitly through sharing personal information on social 
network sites, or secretly via cookies (Bradshaw et al. 2011, p. 196; Loos et al. 2011, pp. 750, 
756-757; Helberger et al. 2013, pp. 162ff; Wauters, Lievens et al. 2014, pp. 10-11). 
Therefore, in our opinion online service providers of “free” online services should also 
comply with the provisions of the Directive.15 
 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that Member States are free to extend the scope of their consumer protection rules to 
persons that do not fall within the definition of the relevant European directive, see already CJEU 14 March 
1991, case C-361/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:118 (Di Pinto), points 21 and 22. 
14 See the opinion of AG Cruz Villalón of 23 April 2015, case C-110/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:271 (Costea), points 
37-44. The Court of Justice, in its decision of 3 September 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:538 (Costea) did not deal 
explicitly with this matter but confirmed that the mere fact that a consumer credit was secured by a mortgage on 
the immovable property that was used by the consumer in the exercise of his professional capacity as a lawyer 
does not exclude the private capacity of the consumer in concluding the consumer credit contract (see points 28-
29 of the judgment). 
15 Moreover, in our view, online service providers that in their standard terms and conditions state “we provide 
you our services for free” commit a misleading and therefore unfair commercial practice as these services in fact 
are not provided for free, see Article 5, paragraph 6, and No. 20 in the Annex to the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive. See for a similar argument for US law Hoofnagle and Whittington 2014, pp. 609. 
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3. Unilateral Changes of Contractual Terms  
One of the most commonly drafted contractual terms by online service providers is a clause 
that allows them to modify the contract’s terms and conditions. When parties agree to 
conclude a contract, they give their consent to enter into a contractual relation governed by a 
certain division of rights and obligations. When one of the parties retains a right to change 
these agreed terms and conditions, this creates an imbalance between parties. In order for the 
national courts to consider such an imbalance unfair under Article 3, paragraph 1, of the 
Directive this imbalance would need to be significant and to the consumer’s detriment. 
Annex I to the Directive indicates in its paragraph 1 under (j) that a clause  
“enabling the seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without 
a valid reason which is specified in the contract”  
may be unfair. However, paragraph 2 under (b) adds that paragraph 1 under (j) is  
“without hindrance to terms under which a seller or supplier reserves the right to 
alter unilaterally the conditions of a contract of indeterminate duration, provided that 
he is required to inform the consumer with reasonable notice and that the consumer is 
free to dissolve the contract.”  
In addition, pursuant to paragraph 1 under (l), a clause  
“providing for the price of goods to be determined at the time of delivery or allowing 
a seller of goods or supplier of services to increase their price without in both cases 
giving the consumer the corresponding right to cancel the contract if the final price is 
too high in relation to the price agreed when the contract was concluded”  
may be unfair, whereas paragraph 2 under (d) provides that this provision  
“is without hindrance to price-indexation clauses, where lawful, provided that the 
method by which prices vary is explicitly described.”  
The CJEU interpreted16 the above-mentioned provisions in their application to clauses 
awarding the trader a unilateral right to modify price terms and decided that they may be 
considered to be fair only if two conditions have been met simultaneously:  
(1) the contract itself indicates under which conditions the price may be changed and 
according to which criteria the change is to be calculated;  
                                                 
16 In particular ECJ 26 April 2012, case C-472/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:242 (NFH/Invitel); ECJ 21 March 2013, 
case C-92/11, ECLI:C:EU:2013:180 (RWE Vertrieb AG/Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV); ECJ 30 
April 2014, case C-26/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:282 (Kásler and Káslerné Rábai/OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt). 
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(2) consumers must have the right to terminate the contract after having been informed that 
the trader indeed wishes to change the price (Keirsbilck 2013, pp. 1471-1472; Leone 2014, 
pp. 316-319; Micklitz and Reich 2014, pp. 786-789; Terryn 2013, pp. 692-693).  
Online traders will not fulfil this first criterion by adding a mere reference to the 
applicable legislation in their terms and conditions. That is to say, simply stating that changes 
of the standard terms and conditions are possible ‘in accordance with applicable national law’ 
is not sufficient. Instead, the conditions for adjusting contractual provisions will need to be 
spelled out in the contract or in the standard terms and conditions themselves. Moreover, 
online service providers cannot compensate the breach of this requirement by informing the 
consumer at a later moment during the contractual performance that the price will be 
changed. Even if they relay this information in good time before the price’s variation occurs, 
and together with the information on the consumer’s right to terminate the contract if she 
does not wish to accept the variation, this information would be provided too late for the 
consumer who is already contractually bound. Only by informing the consumer before the 
contract’s conclusion under what conditions the price may be changed and what the 
calculation method of such changes is can the trader’s legitimate interest in being able to 
respond to a change of circumstances be balanced against the consumer’s equally legitimate 
interests (Rott 2013, pp. 734-735; Terryn 2013, p. 693). First, consumers should be able to 
foresee the consequences, which such a change might in future have for them. Second, they 
should have the necessary data allowing them to react in the best way to their new situation, 
the CJEU reasoned (Leone 2014, pp. 319-320; Wauters, Donoso et al. 2014, p. 8).17  
Moreover, the traders must offer consumers the right to terminate the contract, which is 
the second criterion, in addition to fulfilling the first criterion (Micklitz 2014, p. 145; Rott 
2013, p. 738). In respect of this requirement, the Court stated that  
“(…) it is of fundamental importance (…) that the right of termination given to the 
consumer is not purely formal but can actually be exercised. That would not be the 
case if, for reasons connected with the method of exercise of the right of termination 
or the conditions of the market concerned, the consumer has no real possibility of 
changing supplier (…).”18  
                                                 
17 CJEU 21 March 2013, case C-92/11, ECLI:C:EU:2013:180 (RWE Vertrieb AG/Verbraucherzentrale 
Nordrhein-Westfalen eV), points 50-53. 
18 CJEU 21 March 2013, case C-92/11, ECLI:C:EU:2013:180 (RWE Vertrieb AG/Verbraucherzentrale 
Nordrhein-Westfalen eV), point 54. 
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In our opinion, in the area of online service providers consumers could – at least in 
theory – shop for alternative terms and conditions, suggesting that they can indeed effectively 
be offered the possibility to terminate the contract. 
Although all cases so far decided by the CJEU with regard to modification terms 
pertain to changes of the price or costs charged to the consumer, there does not seem to be a 
good reason not to apply the same reasoning to other unilateral changes of the contract, in 
particular, if they would substantially alter the parties’ other rights and obligations (Leone 
2014, pp. 322-323). In other words, and even though paragraph 1 under (l) of the Annex to 
the Directive refers only to the change of contractual terms defining the price as potentially 
unfair, in our opinion the national courts could apply this provision analogically to a 
substantial change of other terms and conditions. We expect they will declare the terms 
allowing for such changes to be unfair if the conditions under which the terms and conditions 
may be changed are not valid or not specified in the contract or if consumers are not given an 
opportunity to terminate the contract. Moreover, the Court of Justice itself could expand its 
argument in this direction if it were so invited by a national court’s request for a prejudicial 
decision.  
If national courts or the Court of Justice itself indeed follow this line of reasoning, than 
online service providers will find themselves in a lot of trouble. The terms analysed by us and 
used by Facebook, Twitter, Google, and Dropbox are showed in Table 1. Google19 mentions 
that it may modify the standard terms to “for example, reflect changes to the law or changes 
to our Services.” As we have explained above, such a general disclaimer may not satisfy the 
condition of paragraph 1 under (j) of the Annex to the Directive to provide valid reasons for 
change of contractual terms and conditions. Especially, since the online service provider 
secures himself a right to unilaterally change terms and conditions upon a unilateral change 
of services. This practice would then remain fully discretionary and thus potentially unfair. 
Consumers are not notified of changes but are expected to regularly check the website 
containing the standard terms, on which website the changes to the terms will be published 
(Bradshaw et al. 2011, pp. 191-192, 202; 216-217). As a result, consumers may not even be 
aware that the standard terms and conditions of their contracts have changed. Google respects 
a notice period of two weeks, except for such amendments of standard terms that reflect 
changes to the law and changes addressing new functions for a service. A consumer who does 
not accept the changes only has the choice to discontinue the use of the respective service, 
                                                 
19 Google Terms of Service under the heading “About these Terms”. 
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i.e., to terminate the contract. Both the use of the words “for example” in determining for 
what reason the unilateral change may occur and the exception to the availability of a notice 
period for amendments reflecting changes to the law or changes resulting from the 
introduction of new functions to Google’s services indicate that the enumeration of situations 
under which the terms may be changed is not exhaustive. This clearly does not meet the first 
fairness requirement as set out above. The second requirement that may be deduced from the 
case-law of the CJEU and may analogically be applied to all terms and conditions is only 
partially fulfilled, since while consumers in theory have a right to terminate the contract after 
having been informed about the changes, the lack of notification of these changes reduces the 
effectiveness of the right to terminate the contract.  
The standard terms of the other online service providers under scrutiny are at least as 
vague as to the reasons that could lead to a unilateral change of terms and conditions. 
Moreover, they do not even mention the option for the consumer to terminate the contract if 
she does not want to accept changed terms, albeit that termination is available for any reason 
according to their policies. Arguably, Google provides therefore the best practice with regard 
to this contract term. 
Facebook20 indicates it will notify consumers before it changes its Statement of Rights 
and Responsibilities but does not indicate how long before the change it will do so.21 
Moreover, the text of the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities does not indicate how 
Facebook will notify the changes. It does not even attempt to avoid the charge of potential 
unfairness on the basis of paragraph 1 under (j) of the Annex to the Directive since there is no 
explanation given as to what could lead to such a unilateral change of its terms and 
conditions. Still, it is clear that changes to (for instance privacy) policies, guidelines or other 
terms may occur and then they apparently will only be posted on the Facebook’s Site 
Governance Page, if it all.22 Facebook users may thus also miss the fact that their contracts 
have changed. Continued use of the service amounts to acceptance of the changes (Rustad & 
Onufrio 2012, p. 1114). Facebook does not inform consumers about the possibility to 
terminate the contract, although one could argue that if a consumer no longer uses the service 
this may be interpreted as termination. According to the standard terms, the consumer may 
terminate the contract for whatever reasons by deleting her account. However, the standard 
                                                 
20 Article 13.1 of the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities. 
21 In an earlier version of the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, Facebook indicated to respect a notice 
period of seven days. 
22 See 13.2 of the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities. 
10 
 
terms also provide that most of the terms continue to apply even after termination. This 
clearly does not meet any of the two conditions set out by the CJEU. 
Dropbox23 as well provides no reason at all for changes to its standard terms. 
Notification will occur only if a revision “meaningfully” reduces consumer’s rights, but 
whether a change is minor or major apparently is left to the discretion of Dropbox. Moreover, 
consumers may be notified through an email sent to the email address provided by the 
consumer when contracting with Dropbox or through a post on a blog operated by Dropbox 
or on the website where the terms are published. Obviously, most consumers are unlikely to 
notice the latter type of notification. Continued use of the service, again, amounts to 
acceptance of the changes. Consumers may terminate the contract but are not specifically 
informed of that possibility.24  
Finally, under the misleading heading “entire agreement”, Twitter25 reserves the right 
to change the terms at any time for any reason. This broad term also does not list valid 
reasons that could justify the adjustment of contractual terms and conditions, which makes it 
potentially unfair pursuant to paragraph 1 under (j) of the Annex to the Directive. Only 
material changes, to be determined in the sole discretion of Twitter, will be notified. 
Notification will then occur either by an update message or by an email to the email address 
provided by the consumer when the account was created, suggesting that such notification 
should indeed reach the consumer. Continued use of the service, once more, amounts to 
acceptance of the changes. And anew, consumers may terminate the contract but are not 
specifically informed of that possibility, and the most relevant terms continue to apply even 
after termination.26 
In sum, the terms and conditions of the online service providers analysed by us clearly 
fall under the category of terms that potentially are unfair, in particular if national courts 
would analogically apply paragraph 1 under (j) of the Annex to the Directive . Moreover, and 
assuming that national courts or the CJEU itself will indeed extend the current case-law on 
clauses allowing for a unilateral change of the price to clauses allowing for changes of other 
contractual terms, all standard contract terms of online service providers investigated by us 
fail to meet the conditions set by the CJEU on the basis of paragraph 1 under (l) of the Annex 
to the Directive. Online service providers seem to expect consumers to regularly check online 
whether standard contract terms have been adjusted and do not inform them clearly about 
                                                 
23 Dropbox Terms of Service under the heading “Modifications”. 
24 Dropbox Terms of Service under the heading “Termination”. 
25 Article 12 under C of the Terms of Service. 
26 Article 10 of the Terms of Service. 
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their right to terminate the contract. Considering the rapidly evolving technologies, which 
may require continuous revision of existing terms of contract, there is a clear need for a better 
oversight over existing practices in this field (Wauters, Donoso et al. 2014, p. 8).27 
 
4. Unilateral Changes of the Service Itself 
The above-discussed unilateral right to modify contract terms differs from a right to modify 
services, but the second can be the result of the first, since adjustment of the contract terms 
may concern variation in the services’ definition or scope. When consumers conclude a 
contract with an online service provider they expect to receive a certain service. If the service 
provider could unilaterally decide to change this service’s scope or nature that could leave a 
consumer bound to a contract she might not have wanted.  
Paragraph 1 under (k) of Annex I to the Directive lists a clause:  
“enabling the seller or supplier to alter unilaterally without a valid reason any 
characteristics of the product or service to be provided”  
as potentially unfair. Just like with clauses that allow online service providers to modify 
contract terms, service providers should, therefore, be able to justify the need to modify their 
services and should not grant themselves an unlimited unilateral right to modify services. 
Nevertheless, due to the fact that paragraph 2 under (b) of the Annex to the Directive does not 
apply to services’ changes, the Directive does not explicitly require the service providers to 
inform consumers of their intention to modify the services or to give them a reasonable 
amount of time to respond to such a plan, including a right to terminate the contract. National 
laws may have, however, introduced such obligations to safeguard the balance between the 
parties’ rights and obligations. Moreover, it is feasible that the CJEU, in line with its 
reasoning with regard to terms allowing for the unilateral change of contract terms28, will 
argue that a term allowing for a change of the services to be rendered can only be considered 
transparent if it enables the consumer to foresee, on the basis of clear, intelligible criteria, 
which economic consequences derive for her from the term. If the CJEU would follow this 
path, such terms would be allowed only if a consumer would be able to foresee under which 
conditions and circumstances the trader might want to invoke the term.  
We, therefore, argue that a change of the service should be subject to the same 
requirements as changes to the contract terms and the price, i.e.:  
                                                 
27 For example, Google’s privacy policy has been modified twelve times since 2001, see 
https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/archive/ (last visited on 2 December 2014). 
28 See section 3. 
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(1) the contract indicates under which conditions the service may be changed and according 
to which criteria the change is to be calculated; 
(2) consumers have the right to terminate the contract after having been informed that the 
trader indeed wishes to change the service.  
However, as online services may need to be altered both frequently and unexpectedly, the 
requirement that the contract also sets out the criteria according to which the change is to be 
determined might not be entirely suitable to be taken over. For that reason, we will leave that 
part of the conditions set by the CJEU out of consideration when assessing the standard terms 
of the online service providers (Table 2). 
The standard terms used by Facebook29 do not stipulate specific rules pertaining to 
changes of the service. Given the fact that the provision already mentioned in Table 1 does 
not restrict its application’s scope to changes to the Facebook’s standard terms, this provision 
must be intended to apply also with regard to changes of the service itself. We may, 
therefore, refer to the objections raised in the previous section. This means that Facebook’s 
standard contract terms and conditions are potentially unfair since they fall under the 
category of terms that paragraph 1 under (k) of the Annex to the Directive describes and do 
not follow the above-mentioned conditions set by the CJEU that we consider should be used 
in the unfairness’ assessment of these terms. 
The standard terms of Twitter30 provide that Twitter may occasionally change the 
services’ form and nature without prior notice to the consumer or even permanently or 
temporarily stop providing the services or any features within them, again without giving 
prior notice. According to its terms, Twitter, therefore, neither needs to give notice, nor state 
reasons for the service’s change, nor does it have to inform consumers of their right to 
terminate the contract. Twitter’s standard terms and conditions are, therefore, as likely to be 
assessed as unfair as Facebook’s. 
The terms used by Dropbox do not seem to allow for a service’s change. However, 
Dropbox reserves the right to suspend or end the contract at any time at its discretion and 
without giving notice.31 This effectively means that if Dropbox wishes to change its service it 
could simply terminate the contract with all of its customers and offer to conclude new 
contracts for a changed service. Whether such a term is valid will be discussed in the 
following section. 
                                                 
29 Article 14 of the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities. 
30 Article 1 and Article 10 in fine of the Terms of Service.  
31 See the Terms of Service of Dropbox under the heading “Termination”. 
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Finally, Google’s terms32 explicitly allow for a modification of the offered services by 
adding or removing functionalities or features, adding or creating limitations to the services, 
or terminating the services altogether at any time. Only in the case of termination of a 
specific service the consumer is given a reasonable advance notice and a chance to remove 
her data out of the service concerned (as Google describes it). 
Clearly, these terms that provide for a unilateral right for the online service provider to 
change the service itself do not meet the requirements set out in this section. We believe that 
the standard terms used by Facebook, Twitter and Google on this point are unfair. Even if one 
would argue that due to the ever-changing circumstances in the online environment one could 
not expect that the standard terms would have to list under which conditions the service may 
be changed, this argument would not seem to hold with regard to the requirement of a 
reasonable notice and pointing the consumer to the possibility to terminate the contract. 
However, the standard contract terms used by these online service providers do not even meet 
these less burdensome conditions. 
 
5. Unilateral Termination of the Contract by the Online Service Provider 
Another clause that can significantly distort the balance between a consumer and a service 
provider is a clause that gives the latter a unilateral right to terminate the contract at any time, 
for whatever reason. When consumers conclude contracts to use online services they expect, 
amongst other things, to be able to store their documents and photos (in case of cloud-based 
storage services or social networks) or to communicate with their families and friends (in 
case of social networks or e-mailing services). Clearly, from the consumer’s perspective, if 
the online service provider could terminate the contract at any time and for any reason that 
could seriously undermine the whole purpose of entering into the contract. Hence, if an 
online service provider informs consumers in advance that, e.g., they would only be able to 
store documents online, send e-mails or use a social network for a month or two, such 
consumers would be likely to choose the service of another, more reliable party instead.  
In many cases the service offered by online service providers is “free of charge”, that is 
not paid for in money. Whether consumers pay for online services in money or not may 
influence the evaluation of the unfair character of a contractual term. First, consumers may 
expect less certainty from a “free” service. Second, consumers could then not as easily prove 
that due to the service provider’s right to unilaterally terminate the contract without a valid 
                                                 
32 Google Terms of Service under the heading “Modifying and Terminating our Services”. 
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reason the parties’ position would be significantly unbalanced. However, in many cases 
consumers pay for such “free” services in other than monetary ways, typically, by being 
exposed to advertisements or by providing their personal data (see above, section 2). The fact 
that the consumer does not pay a price in money can, therefore, not justify the online service 
provider’s right to terminate a contract for whatever reason at any time, in particular not, 
when the consumer has already provided her personal data and thus has rendered her 
performance. This fact should, therefore, be taken into account in the evaluation. 
Changed circumstances may force a trader to discontinue a product or a service offered 
by that trader. For that reason, a term allowing the trader to unilaterally terminate the contract 
may be fair under certain conditions. However, such a term should consider the reasonable 
interests of the consumer. A right to unilaterally terminate the contract may be unfair, in 
particular, where the consumer has a reasonable interest in preserving the contract’s 
longevity, because she has foreseeably invested time and effort in the services offered by the 
trader, e.g., by importing and storing data in “her” part of the cloud. This is all the more true 
if the trader does not inform the consumer of its intention to terminate the contract or the 
service or does not observe a reasonably long notice period allowing the consumer to 
withdraw her data from the cloud and transferring it elsewhere (Bradshaw et al. 2011, pp. 
203-204). 
The Annex to the Directive contains two provisions dealing with the contract’s 
termination by the trader: paragraph 1 under (f) lists as a potentially unfair contract term a 
clause 
“authorizing the seller or supplier to dissolve the contract on a discretionary basis 
where the same facility is not granted to the consumer, or permitting the seller or 
supplier to retain the sums paid for services not yet supplied by him where it is the 
seller or supplier himself who dissolves the contract.”  
In addition, paragraph 1 under (g) concerns terms  
“enabling the seller or supplier to terminate a contract of indeterminate duration 
without reasonable notice except where there are serious grounds for doing so.” 
The provision under (f) deals with reciprocity: if the trader reserves his right to 
terminate unilaterally at will, such a clause is likely to be fair only where the consumer may 
do the same. It should be noted that the mere fact that the consumer is awarded a similar right 
to unilaterally terminate the contract does not automatically signify that the term is fair. As 
paragraph 1 under (f) of the Annex to the Directive indicates, the term could still be unfair if 
it allows the trader when he terminates the contract to keep the consumer’s remuneration for 
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services not yet rendered. Such a term would imply that the trader receives at least a part of 
his remuneration for services he does not render. This could apply also in cases of “free” 
services where the trader is able to continue using (or selling) personal data received from the 
consumer without performing his part of the contract. The provision under (g) clarifies that in 
the case of a contract of indeterminate duration, i.e., a contract that does not end 
automatically and can only end through termination, termination by the trader in itself may be 
justified but the trader either is required to have serious reasons for termination with 
immediate effect, or needs to respect a reasonable notice period. Therefore, terms allowing 
the trader to terminate the contract with immediate effect without there being serious reasons 
for such termination may be considered unfair. In such circumstances, additional problems 
may arise if the trader has immediately upon termination of the service deleted the 
consumer’s data stored within the service (Bradshaw et al. 2011, p. 204). 
It seems likely that the CJEU, as it did with regard to terms allowing for a unilateral 
change of the price, will jointly evaluate these two Directive’s provisions when determining 
under which conditions a term allowing for unilateral termination can be considered as fair. 
In this respect it should be remarked that if unilateral termination is possible too easily, 
contractual performance would be entirely dependent on the trader’s discretion, which would 
undermine the consumer’s trust in the binding force of the contract. Moreover, if unilateral 
termination is readily available to the trader this would undermine the effectiveness of the 
rules developed by the CJEU to restrict the validity of terms allowing for a unilateral change 
of the price, as such rules could then be easily circumvented by traders simply terminating the 
contract and offering the consumer to conclude a new contract under acceptance of the 
changed standard terms or price.  
Therefore, we predict that the CJEU would interpret paragraphs 1 under (f) and (g) of 
the Annex to the Directive in a way that would find a standard term allowing for unilateral 
termination by the trader to be unfair if:  
(1) the trader need not notify the termination before effecting it (on the basis of paragraph 1 
under (g) of the Annex to the Directive);  
(2) the trader need not state any reasons for termination (on the basis of paragraph 1 under (g) 
of the Annex to the Directive);  
(3) the trader may terminate the contract also in case of minor infringement of the contract 
terms by the consumer (on the basis of paragraph 1 under (g) of the Annex to the Directive);   
(4) the reasons for termination have not been stated in the contract or in the standard terms 
(on the basis of paragraph 1 under (g) of the Annex to the Directive);  
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(5) the trader is not required to observe a reasonable period for termination, taking into 
account the consumer’s reasonable interests, apart from serious reasons justifying immediate 
termination (on the basis of paragraph 1 under (g) of the Annex to the Directive);  
(6) it is left up to the trader’s sole discretion to determine whether there is a serious reason 
justifying immediate termination (on the basis of paragraph 1 under (g) of the Annex to the 
Directive);  
(7) the consumer is not awarded a similar right of unilateral termination at will (on the basis 
of paragraph 1 under (f) of the Annex to the Directive); or 
(8) the trader is allowed to keep prepayments made by the consumer for services not rendered 
(on the basis of paragraph 1 under (f) of the Annex to the Directive). 
On the other hand, if the trader has drafted the termination clause in such a way that the 
right to termination is limited to situations where the trader has a valid reason for it, these 
reasons have been stated in the contract and a reasonable notice period would be observed, it 
is likely that a national court would not find such a term unfair, in particular if a reciprocal 
right would be granted to the consumer. A valid reason could be found in a situation where 
the consumer violated the terms of the service and the infringement was not merely minor in 
nature, but also where a digital product was outdated and replaced by a new product, making 
it economically unviable to continue the service. Moreover, the trader could almost certainly 
avoid the abusive character of the clause if he gave consumer an option to contest his reason 
for termination and if the termination would not be effected until a court or an ADR or ODR 
institution had ruled on the consumer’s complaint. 
The relevant terms used by Facebook, Twitter, Google, and Dropbox with respect to 
unilateral termination are showed in Table 3. First, though, we remark that consumer 
contracts with these online service providers are usually of indeterminate duration, which 
means that paragraph 1 under (g) of the Annex to the Directive applies to them. Dropbox’s 
terms33 reserve the right for Dropbox to suspend or end services at any time at its discretion 
and without notice. This provision, therefore, mirrors the presumably unfair terms listed 
above under (1) and (2). In our view, the term is hence to be considered unfair on these two 
grounds. Exceptionally, when Dropbox terminates the contract due to non-activity during 12 
consecutive months, Dropbox commits itself to give the consumer prior notice via the email 
address associated with the consumer’s account. However, Dropbox still does not indicate 
how far in advance such a notice must be given (Bradshaw et al. 2011, p. 197). Even if we 
                                                 
33 See the Terms of Service of Dropbox under the heading “Termination”. 
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acknowledge that this term meets the first two requirements, it could, nevertheless, be 
regarded as unfair if the court would find the absence of an indication as to the length of the 
notice period as not prescribing a reasonable period for termination, as listed above under (5). 
These provisions are then potentially unfair on the basis of paragraph 1 under (g) of the 
Annex to the Directive. However, since Dropbox provides for a reciprocal right of unilateral 
termination to its consumers, consumers could not invoke paragraph 1 under (f) of the Annex 
to the Directive against Dropbrox. 
Facebook34 provides that when the consumer violates the contract’s letter or spirit, or if 
she otherwise creates risk or possible legal exposure for Facebook, it may terminate the 
contract. In particular, the latter part of this clause is drafted so broadly that even writing this 
paper could instigate a contract’s termination by Facebook of any Facebook-account we 
might have (Leydon 2013; Moses 2008). Moreover, the same term states that notification 
may be provided by email or on the Facebook website the next time when the consumer 
attempts to access her account, suggesting that termination has already taken effect without 
respecting any notice period. Clearly, several of the possibly unfair terms listed above, in 
particular the ones listed under (1), (3) and (5), could be invoked here to contest the validity 
of Facebook’s terms (Rustad & Onufrio 2012, p. 1114; Wauters, Lievens et al. 2014, pp. 31-
34). Again, consumers could contest Facebook’s terms on the basis that they fall under the 
category of potentially unfair contract terms as described in paragraph 1 under (g) of the 
Annex to the Directive, but not be able to invoke paragraph 1 under (f) of the Annex to the 
Directive. 
The same applies to the standard terms used by Twitter.35 In addition, Twitter 
provides in its terms that it may suspend or terminate the contract if it “reasonably 
believe[s]” that the consumer has violated the contract terms or the Twitter Rules. This 
implies that Twitter need not even prove that the consumer has breached her contractual 
obligations; it suffices if it reasonably believes that this is the case. This effectively means 
that the consumer would have to prove that she has not breached the contract, thus reversing 
the burden of proof. Such a term is listed as potentially unfair in the Annex to the Directive 
under paragraph 1 sub (q). And even if the consumer would prove that she has not violated 
the contract, this still may not be enough if Twitter nevertheless believes otherwise. In other 
words, this term in fact resembles also the possibly unfair terms listed under (2) and (6), 
                                                 
34 Article 14 of the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities. 
35 Article 10 of the Terms of Service. 
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reflecting some of the requirements listed in paragraph 1 under (g) of the Annex to the 
Directive.  
 Finally, Google’s terms36 provide that it may suspend or stop a service altogether and, 
more specifically, that it may stop providing services to a particular consumer. This creates 
an unlimited, unrestricted termination right. Moreover, Google does not need to observe the 
notice requirement and termination of the contract may take immediate effect. Clearly, this 
term mirrors listed clauses (1) to (6) and is likely to be considered unfair on the basis of 
paragraph 1 under (g) of the Annex to the Directive. 
We may, therefore, conclude that the termination clauses in the standard contract terms of 
each of these online service providers appear to be unfair in as far as they do not respect 
fairness requirements posed for termination of contracts of indeterminate duration. All these 
online service providers fulfil, however, the requirement of reciprocity in giving consumers 
an opportunity to unilaterally terminate their contracts as well.  
 
6. Liability Exclusions and Limitations 
Online service providers may have valid reasons for limiting their liability against consumers. 
Even if this does not apply to the cases we have analysed, online service providers often are 
small businesses that could not afford being sued to cover potentially extensive losses 
sustained by consumers, especially when they deliver their services to consumers without 
receiving payment in money. Therefore, under certain circumstances clauses limiting or 
excluding the liability of online service providers could be justified. Still, a full exclusion or a 
broad limitation of liability, regardless of what caused the damage, whether the damage was 
caused intentionally or through gross negligent behaviour, and regardless of the type of 
damage sustained, will often be seen as unjustified, significantly distorting the balance 
between the parties’ rights and obligations and, therefore, unfair (Bradshaw et al. 2011, p. 
211; Wauters, Lievens et al. 2014, p. 26).  
Annex I, paragraph 1 under (a) to the Directive mentions as potentially unfair a clause  
“excluding or limiting the legal liability of a seller or supplier in the event of the 
death of a consumer or personal injury to the latter resulting from an act or omission 
of that seller or supplier”  
and paragraph 1 under (b) a clause  
                                                 
36 Google Terms of Service under the heading “Modifying and Terminating our Services”. 
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“inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-á-vis the 
seller or supplier or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance or 
inadequate performance by the seller or supplier of any of the contractual obligations 
(…).”  
While it may be difficult to imagine a situation where an act of an online service 
provider leads to the consumer’s death or a personal injury37, it is feasible to foresee an 
online service provider’s failure to properly perform its services. The question is then 
whether and under which circumstances the exclusion or limitation of liability may be 
“inappropriate”. 
The terms used by Facebook38, Twitter39, Google40, and Dropbox41 to exclude or limit 
their liability towards their clients are showed in Table 4. All examined online service 
providers include a clause in their standard terms and conditions that states that services are 
provided “as is” (Bradshaw et al. 2011, p. 215; Rustad & Onufrio 2012, p. 1126). The 
purpose of this clause is to exclude the online service provider’s liability for any disturbance 
in the availability or reliability of the service and to ascertain that he gives no guarantees with 
regards to the provision of his services. Indirectly, the clause, therefore, aims to exclude any 
liability by stating that the consumer could not reasonably expect the service to be rendered 
without disturbances. It may depend on a given national law whether such a clause would be 
considered or presumed unfair. It seems clear, however, that there will be circumstances, in 
which the service may not be available to the consumer due to the service provider’s fault or 
negligence. In our view, this term unfairly does not distinguish between disturbances caused 
due to the service provider’s fault or negligence and disturbances caused outside the service 
provider’s sphere. In this respect, we hold this term to be unfair since it seems to 
“inappropriately” limit the online service provider’s liability in the event of non-performance 
of his contractual obligations. 
In addition, some online service providers further limit their liability by excluding, for 
instance, data or financial losses, or indirect, special, consequential, exemplary, or punitive 
damages, or by capping their liability. The relevant terms used by Facebook42, Twitter43, 
Google44, and Dropbox45 are showed in this respect in Table 5. 
                                                 
37 Though it is imaginable that some people may be significantly emotionally disturbed if their online services 
are blocked or disrupted, in particular if, e.g., their digital photographs are erased. 
38 Article 15.3 of the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities of Facebook. 
39 Article 11 under A of the Terms of Service. 
40 See Google Terms of Service under the heading “Our Warranties and Disclaimers”. 
41 Terms of Service of Dropbox under the heading “Services ‘AS IS’”. 
42 Article 15.3 of the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities of Facebook. 
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Such additional limitations may also be found unfair, in particular when read in 
conjunction with the already far-reaching limitation on the basis of the “as is” term described 
above. However, the laws of the different Member States may assess such limitations to the 
online service provider’s liability very differently as to what could be seen as an 
“inappropriate” limitation of their rights in case of the non-performance (Bradshaw et al. 
2011, pp. 210-213). Unfortunately, there is no general indication of the acceptability of such 
terms under EU law. Therefore, it will be necessary to carefully consider the unfairness of 
exemption clauses or of clauses limiting particular liability under each given national law. 
 
7. International Jurisdiction Clauses 
Articles 17-19 of the Brussels I-Regulation (recast)46 create specific jurisdiction for consumer 
contracts. Article 17, paragraph 1, determines that (in so far as it is relevant here) a contract 
falls within the scope of these provisions if it is concluded 
(1) by a person (the consumer) acting for a purpose outside her trade or profession,  
(2) with another party (the trader) who  
(a) pursues commercial or professional activities in the Member State of the 
consumer’s domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that Member State or 
to several States including that Member State, and  
(b) the contract falls within the scope of such activities. 
With regard to these requirements, in a joint declaration by the Council and the 
Commission on Article 15 of the identical provision of the former Brussels I-Regulation47 it 
is stated, inter alia, that for the specific rules of the Brussels I-Regulation pertaining to 
consumer contracts to apply, the contract concluded must fall within the framework of the 
targeted activities, and that the mere fact that an Internet site is accessible from the 
consumer’s place of residence is not sufficient for their applicability (Cordera 2001, pp. 249-
250; Trstenjak 2013, pp. 473-475). This joint declaration identifies as relevant factors in 
determining whether the requirements of (then) Article 15 of the Brussels I-Regulation are 
                                                                                                                                                        
43 Article 11 under C of the Terms of Service. 
44 See Google Terms of Service under the heading “Liability for our Services”. 
45 Terms of Service of Dropbox under the heading “Limitation of Liability”. 
46 Regulation (EU) no 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), OJ 
2012, L 351/1. The Regulation will be referred to as: Brussels I-Regulation (recast). The Regulation applies as 
of 10 January 2015 (art. 81 Brussels I-Regulation (recast)). Before that date, Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 
of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, OJ 2001, L 12/1 applied, which contained the same provisions in Articles 15-17. 
47 The declaration is available at http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/homepage/homepage_ec_en_declaration.pdf 
(last visited on 7 August 2015). 
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met the fact that the Internet site solicits the conclusion of contracts by consumers at a 
distance and that the contract is in fact concluded at a distance. The language or currency 
which a website uses does not constitute such a relevant factor (Wauters, Lievens et al. 2014, 
pp. 20-21). In recent judgments the CJEU further lowered the requirements for the 
application of (then) Article 15 Brussels I-Regulation by declaring that even if the contract 
was not concluded at a distance that should not preclude consumers from enjoying this 
protection.48  
If Article 17 Brussels I-Regulation (recast) applies, a claim against the consumer may 
only be brought in the courts of the Member State in which the consumer is domiciled 
(Article 18, paragraph 2), whereas the consumer who brings proceedings against the trader 
may also choose for the courts of the Member State in which the trader is domiciled (Article 
18, paragraph 1). The parties may derogate from the provisions of Article 18 to the detriment 
of the consumer only once a dispute has arisen.49 This implies that a contractual derogation of 
the international jurisdiction rules of the Brussels I-Regulation is contrary to the law. 
Therefore, it is not even necessary to determine whether or not such a term would be 
considered unfair under the Directive – which it undoubtedly would be since even domestic 
jurisdiction clauses have been found unfair as early as in 2000.50 
Nevertheless, such clauses still appear in many sets of standard contract terms of online 
service providers, who often offer their services to consumers of more than one Member 
State (Table 6).  
The standard terms of Facebook,51 Dropbox,52 and Twitter53 include a jurisdiction 
clause awarding exclusive jurisdiction to U.S. federal courts or state courts in California. 
These terms are clearly contrary to the above-described provisions of the Brussels I-
Regulation (recast) and would therefore be found unfair and any competent consumer 
organization or public authority could challenge them without much difficulty (Rustad & 
Onufrio 2012, pp. 1126-1127; Wauters, Lievens et al. 2014, p. 24). The standard terms of 
Google54 also foresee adjudication by California courts but provide that “if the courts in your 
country will not permit you to consent to the jurisdiction and venue of the courts in Santa 
                                                 
48 CJEU 6 September 2012, case C 190/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:542 (Mühlleitner/Yusufi), points 35-45; CJEU 17 
October 2013, case C-218/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:666 (Emrek/Sabranovic), point 25. 
49 See Article 19 Brussels I-Regulation (recast). 
50 CJEU 27 June 2000, joint cases C-240/98 u/i C-244/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:346, [ECR] 2000, p. I-4941 
(Océano). 
51 Article 15.1 of the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities. 
52 See the Terms of Service Dropbox under the heading “Resolving Disputes”. 
53 Article 12 under B of the Terms of Service. 
54 Google Terms of Service under the heading “About these Terms”. 
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Clara County, California, U.S.A., then your local jurisdiction and venue will apply to such 
disputes related to these terms.” One could argue that since this term, which evidently is not 
drafted in clear and intelligible language, in itself does not take away the protection offered 
by the Brussels I-Regulation (recast) and, therefore, does not lead to a derogation of the law, 
it would be acceptable. However, as a typical consumer would not know, on the basis of this 
term, that she is not required by this clause to file a claim in a California court but may do so 
in a court of her own country, the clause may, nevertheless, lead consumers to abstain from 
starting legal proceedings and as such be considered unfair (Bradshaw et al. 2011, p. 200; 
Faure & Luth 2011, p. 353). In addition, it is uncertain whether, if Google would bring a case 
against a consumer before a California court, that court would recognize and accept that 
under the Brussels I-Regulation (recast) the claim must be brought before a court in the 
country where the consumer lives and declare itself to be incompetent to hear the case. This 
would mean that such a term is effective after all even though it is contrary to mandatory 
European consumer law. Therefore, we believe that also the term applied by Google is unfair 
within the meaning of Article 3 of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, but recognize that a 
court may decide otherwise with regard to this clause. This is not likely to be the case with 
regard to the terms used by Facebook, Twitter and Dropbox since their terms are clearly 
contrary to the international jurisdiction rules of the Brussels I-Regulation (recast). 
 
8. Choice-of-law clauses 
Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Rome I-Regulation55 sets out that the parties to a contract may 
choose the law applicable to their contract provided that the choice is made  
‘expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the contract or the circumstances 
of the case.’  
This could suggest that a choice-of-law clause included in standard contract terms would not 
suffice to prescribe a valid choice for the applicable law, unless the trader has specifically 
drawn the consumer’s attention to the term, e.g., by indicating that a choice-of-law clause is 
included in the standard contract terms. According to Articles 3, paragraph 5, and 10 Rome I-
Regulation the existence and the validity of the consumer’s consent to a choice-of-law clause 
is to be decided on the basis of the chosen law. This implies that the consent may be void or 
voided under the chosen applicable law in cases of, for instance, duress, fraud or other vices 
                                                 
55 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ 2008, L 177/6. 
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of consent, but also by virtue of the rules on the incorporation of standard terms or those on 
unfair contract terms. 
Where the parties have not made a valid choice-of-law, Article 4 Rome I-Regulation 
provides that a contract for the sale of goods or the provision of services is governed by the 
law of the seller’s or service provider’s habitual residence. However, Article 6, paragraph 1, 
Rome I-Regulation determines that a contract concluded by a consumer with a trader is 
governed by the law of the place where the consumer lives, provided that  
(a) the professional pursues its commercial or professional activities in the country where the 
consumer has her habitual residence, or directs such activities to that country or to several 
countries including that country, and  
(b) the contract falls within the scope of such activities.  
Paragraph 2 adds that the parties may, nevertheless, choose another law in accordance with 
Article 3 of the Rome I-Regulation, but such choice may not deprive the consumer of the 
protection of the mandatory law of the consumer’s place of residence.  
The criteria listed in Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Rome I-Regulation are the same as 
those that are listed in Article 17 of the Brussels I-Regulation (recast) (Rustad & Onufrio 
2012, p. 1130). In this respect, it is not surprising that recital (7) of the preamble to the Rome 
I-Regulation states that the substantive scope and the provisions of that regulation should be 
consistent with that of the (former) Brussels I-Regulation, whereas recital (24) explicitly 
indicates that the concept of “directed activity” in Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Rome I-
Regulation should be interpreted in the same manner as in (then) Article 15, paragraph 1, of 
the Brussels I-Regulation. 
Given the close relationship between the Brussels I-Regulation and the Rome I-
Regulation, where the requirements of Articles 17-19 Brussels I-Regulation (recast) are met, 
this entails that also the requirements of Article 6 of the Rome I-Regulation are met. This 
implies that choice-of-law clauses are valid in so far as they are incorporated into the contract 
by a valid expression of consent by the consumer. However, they cannot lead to the result 
that the consumer is deprived of the protection offered by the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive, nor is she excluded from the protection of the mandatory law of the consumer’s 
place of residence in so far as she demonstrates that the trader had directed his activities to 
the country where the consumer has her domicile and the contract pertains to such activities.  
Moreover, even if a choice-of-law clause in itself is incorporated validly into the 
contract with a consumer this clause could still be considered unfair under Article 3 of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive. This could occur if it gives the false impression to the 
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consumer that her national law is irrelevant for the dispute she has with the online service 
provider, for instance by falsely claiming that the law of the country where the service 
provide is located is applicable with the exclusion of any other law. The result of such a 
clause would be that the consumer is not able to ascertain what her rights and obligations 
under the contract are, as she is made to believe that her contract is governed by a foreign law 
with which she will typically not be familiar with. Such a clause would likely violate the 
principle of good faith and distort the balance between the parties’ rights and obligation to the 
detriment of the consumer. 
Clearly, not all sets of online standard terms will meet the requirements set by 
European law (Table 7). For instance, the standard terms of Dropbox56 and Facebook57 
provide that the contract is governed by California law.58 Twitter59 goes much further by 
stating that the terms are regulated by California law “without regard to or application of (...) 
your state or country of residence”, which apparently intends (in badly drafted text, we might 
add) to explicitly exclude the application of the law of the consumer’s domicile. Therefore, 
the standard terms and conditions of these online service providers violate the Rome I-
Regulation and will be seen as unfair.  
The most decent set of terms of these four major internationally operating online 
service providers appears to have been used by Google60. Again, a choice for California law 
is made, but it is also indicated that “the courts in some countries will not apply California 
law to some types of disputes. If you reside in one of those countries, then where California 
law is excluded from applying, your country’s laws will apply to such disputes related to 
these terms.” One could argue that since the term does not take away the protection offered 
by the Rome I-Regulation it would not be unfair. However, as a typical consumer would not 
know, on the basis of this term, that in fact her own law is the applicable law, the clause may, 
nevertheless, lead consumers to abstain from starting legal proceedings. They may, 
unsurprisingly, not be able to properly assess their chances of winning the case due to their 
ignorance of California law or be afraid of the costs involved in adjudicating the case on the 
basis of a foreign law (whether or not also in a foreign court). There is therefore a risk that on 
                                                 
56 See the Terms of Service of Dropbox under the heading “Controlling Law”. 
57 Article 15.1 of the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities. 
58 Interestingly, Facebook makes an exception for consumers living in Germany, where German law is declared 
to be the applicable law. See Article 16.3 of the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities linking to special 
terms for German consumers, and point 5 of those terms; the special terms are available online at 
https://www.facebook.com/terms/provisions/german/index.php (last visited on 7 August 2015). 
59 Article 12 under B of the Terms of Service. 
60 Google Terms of Service under the heading “About these Terms”. 
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the basis of such considerations consumers could be withheld from bringing a case before 
their national court or from defending their position against a claim brought by Google. We, 
therefore, believe that also the term applied by Google is unfair within the meaning of Article 
3 of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, but recognize that a court may decide otherwise 
with regard to this clause. 
 
9. Transparency 
Leaving substantive complaints pertaining to other clauses used by online service providers 
aside, the issue of their lack of transparency could be raised, as well. While it is well-known 
that internet users often do not read any disclosures, contractual terms etc. provided to them 
online, it remains paramount to draw the user’s attention to contractual terms and conditions 
parallel to drafting them in a way that would facilitate user’s reading and understanding of 
these terms (Leone 2014, pp. 322-323; Wauters, Donoso et al. 2014, p. 10; Wilhelmsson 
2006, p. 55). This would require online service providers to draft these terms in a legible, 
clear and transparent way, as well as to make them prominently visible on their websites. 
Article 5 of the Directive requires contract terms to be  
“drafted in plain, intelligible language. Where there is doubt about the meaning of a 
term, the interpretation most favourable to the consumer shall prevail.”  
This provision obliges online service providers to use transparent contract terms, however, 
the standard for this transparency has not been further defined in the Directive. Moreover, the 
only sanction explicitly provided for the breach of the transparency requirement is the contra 
proferentem interpretation rule (Armbrüster 2008, pp. 168-169; Leone 2014, pp. 323-324). 
However, in the recent Kásler-case the CJEU clarified that where a term is non-transparent, a 
national court needs to consider this when it assesses the term’s unfairness.61 That is to say, 
national courts should check whether the lack of transparency is contrary to good faith and 
creates a significant imbalance between the parties’ rights and obligations to the detriment of 
the consumer. 
In addition, paragraph 1 under (i) of Annex I to the Directive classifies as potentially 
unfair a clause  
“ irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of 
becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract.”  
                                                 
61 See CJEU 30 April 2014, case C-26/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:282 (Kásler and Káslerné Rábai/OTP Jelzálogbank 
Zrt), points 73-74. 
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The CJEU has not yet applied this provision with respect to non-transparent contractual terms 
and conditions, but such an interpretation thereof is feasible. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
lack of transparency may sometimes render a term to be unfair as it may mislead consumers 
with regard to their rights and obligations,62 transparency also has a more independent role to 
play. That is to say, it may enable consumers to actually become aware of their rights and 
obligations, both prior to and post the moment of the contract’s conclusion (Armbrüster 2008, 
pp. 167-168; Leone 2014, pp. 322-323; Micklitz 2014, p. 143, 145; Micklitz and Reich 2014, 
p. 788; Rott 2013, pp. 733-734). Therefore, it could be considered that consumers should not 
be bound by contractual terms, which are hard to access, read and understand for an average 
consumer. Hindering access to contractual terms, e.g., through the use of many hyperlinks 
leading consumers from one website to another and yet another,63 or drafting contractual 
terms in a technical, hard-to-grasp language could be seen as not providing consumers with a 
“real opportunity” to read the contract (Girot 2001, pp. 318-319, 322; Micklitz 2014, p. 143). 
In our view, where this is the case the transparency principle is breached and a term should 
either be considered as not having been validly incorporated into the contract or as unfair.  
Similarly, in order for the consumer to be able to ascertain her rights and obligations 
under the contract the standard contract terms must be drafted in a language the consumer is 
or should be able to understand (Girot 2001, pp. 327-329; Micklitz 2014, p. 143). In our 
view, the consumer may expect the terms to be drafted in either her mother tongue or the 
language in which the contract has been concluded. In the latter case, the consumer 
knowingly concluded a contract in another language than her mother’s tongue and may be 
expected to properly master that language or to have accepted the consequences of not being 
able to properly understand that language. However, in our view, the transparency principle is 
breached where the standard contract terms are neither drafted in the consumer’s mother 
tongue nor in the language in which the contract is concluded. National courts should 
consider such terms either as not having been validly incorporated into the contract or as 
unfair.  
 
                                                 
62 The clauses on limitation of or exemption from liability, and the jurisdiction and choice-of-law clauses are 
examples thereof since they may convince consumers that the service provider is not liable and legal action is to 
be taken in the US under US law. 
63 For instance, Facobook’s Data Use Policy consists of no less than 6 separate documents, which moreover also 
refer the consumer back and forth to her privacy and notifications settings, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s 
Safe Harbor website, Facebook’s help page, its security page and the Site Governance Page. 
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10. Conclusions 
On the basis of our research we have identified several types of contractual terms that 
international online service providers provide to consumers, which would be unlikely to pass 
the Directive’s unfairness test. We believe that the contractual terms mentioned in this paper 
should be challenged in court, as well as that they should be tested ex officio by national 
courts. Moreover, we suggest that national courts refer more questions to the CJEU for a 
prejudicial ruling on the interpretation of the unfairness test with regard to the contract terms 
discussed in this paper, especially pertaining the role of the Annex therein. If the CJEU 
confirmed the unfairness of these terms, this would then have a harmonizing effect on the 
online service providers’ practices with regards to drafting online contractual terms. For 
example, it would improve legal certainty to ascertain whether traders have the same 
obligations when they draft contract terms allowing them to change the contract’s price and 
when they draft contract terms allowing them to change other contractual terms. 
However, as it seems unlikely that individual consumers will in fact bring a claim 
against an online service provider for what many consumers still perceive to be “free” 
services, we believe there is a task here for consumer authorities and other public bodies, and 
for consumer organizations. In this respect it is important to realize that under European 
Union law, where consumer protection rules are infringed, a consumer organization or a 
consumer authority is normally allowed to bring a claim against the infringing trader before 
its own courts under (now) Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Brussels I-Regulation (recast), as the 
Court of Justice of the European Union explained in the Henkel-case, provided that the trader 
targets at least also consumers domiciled in that country.64 In other words: would an 
individual consumer be able to bring a claim against the trader before her own court under 
Articles 17-19 of the Brussels I-Regulation (recast), then the consumer organization or the 
consumer authority representing the interests of such a consumer would be able to bring the 
trader before that same court under Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Regulation. Moreover, it 
seems likely that the Rome II-Regulation65 will be applicable as regards the determination of 
the law applicable to such a case.66 If this is indeed the case, the law applicable would be the 
law of the country where the consumer whose interests are being represented has her habitual 
                                                 
64 CJEU 1 October 2002, case C-167/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:555 (Verein für Konsumenteninformation/Henkel), 
points 37-48. 
65 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations, OJ 2007, L 199/40. 
66 On 27 April 2015 the highest Austrian court, the Oberster Gerichtshof, has referred a question for prejudicial 
ruling on this point; the case is currently pending, see case C-191/15 (Verein für 
Konsumenteninformation/Amazon EU). 
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residence, which implies that the consumer organization or the consumer authority would 
normally be allowed to bring the claim in its own country and under its own law.67 In this 
respect, the international character of these online services need not stand in the way of 
effective collective enforcement of EU consumer law (see Djurovic 2013, p. 254). 
   
  
                                                 
67 See in particular Articles 2, paragraph 2, and 4, paragraphs 1 and 2, Rome II-Regulation, in accordance with 
recital (7) to the Regulation read in conjunction with the Brussels I- and Rome I-Regulations. 
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Table 1 
 
Facebook We’ll notify you before we make changes to these terms and give you the 
opportunity to review and comment on the revised terms before continuing to 
use our Services. 
If we make changes to policies, guidelines or other terms referenced in or 
incorporated by this Statement, we may provide notice on the Site Governance 
Page. 
Your continued use of Facebook following notice of the changes to our terms, 
policies or guidelines, constitutes your acceptance of our amended terms, 
policies or guidelines.       
Twitter We may revise these Terms from time to time, the most current version will 
always be at twitter.com/tos. If the revision, in our sole discretion, is material we 
will notify you via an @Twitter update or e-mail to the email associated with 
your account. By continuing to access or use the Services after those revisions 
become effective, you agree to be bound by the revised Terms. 
Google We may modify these terms or any additional terms that apply to a Service to, 
for example, reflect changes to the law or changes to our Services. You should 
look at the terms regularly. We’ll post notice of modifications to these terms on 
this page. We’ll post notice of modified additional terms in the applicable 
Service. Changes will not apply retroactively and will become effective no 
sooner than fourteen days after they are posted. However, changes addressing 
new functions for a Service or changes made for legal reasons will be effective 
immediately. If you do not agree to the modified terms for a Service, you should 
discontinue your use of that Service. 
Dropbox We may revise these Terms from time to time, and will always post the most 
current version on our website. If a revision meaningfully reduces your rights, 
we will notify you (by, for example, sending a message to the email address 
associated with your account, posting on our blog or on this page). By 
continuing to use or access the Services after the revisions come into effect, you 
agree to be bound by the revised Terms. 
 
Table 2 
WDEOH
  
Facebook We’ll notify you before we make changes to these terms and give you the 
opportunity to review and comment on the revised terms before continuing to 
use our Services. 
If we make changes to policies, guidelines or other terms referenced in or 
incorporated by this Statement, we may provide notice on the Site Governance 
Page. 
Your continued use of Facebook following notice of the changes to our terms, 
policies or guidelines, constitutes your acceptance of our amended terms, 
policies or guidelines.   
Twitter The Services that Twitter provides are always evolving and the form and nature 
of the Services that Twitter provides may change from time to time without prior 
notice to you. In addition, Twitter may stop (permanently or temporarily) 
providing the Services (or any features within the Services) to you or to users 
generally and may not be able to provide you with prior notice. We also retain 
the right to create limits on use and storage at our sole discretion at any time 
without prior notice to you. 
(…) 
Nothing in this section shall affect Twitter’s rights to change, limit or stop the 
provision of the Services without prior notice, as provided above in section 1. 
Google We are constantly changing and improving our Services. We may add or remove 
functionalities or features, and we may suspend or stop a Service altogether. 
You can stop using our Services at any time, although we’ll be sorry to see you 
go. Google may also stop providing Services to you, or add or create new limits 
to our Services at any time. 
We believe that you own your data and preserving your access to such data is 
important. If we discontinue a Service, where reasonably possible, we will give 
you reasonable advance notice and a chance to get information out of that 
Service. 
Dropbox - 
Table 3 
 
Facebook If you violate the letter or spirit of this Statement, or otherwise create risk or 
possible legal exposure for us, we can stop providing all or part of Facebook to 
you. We will notify you by email or at the next time you attempt to access your 
account. You may also delete your account or disable your application at any 
time. In all such cases, this Statement shall terminate, but the following 
provisions will still apply: 2.2, 2.4, 3-5, 89.3, and 14-18. 
Twitter You may end your legal agreement with Twitter at any time for any or no reason 
by deactivating your accounts and discontinuing your use of the Services. You 
do not need to specifically inform Twitter when you stop using the Services. If 
you stop using the Services without deactivating your accounts, your accounts 
may be deactivated due to prolonged inactivity under our Inactive Account 
Policy. 
We may suspend or terminate your accounts or cease providing you with all or 
part of the Services at any time for any reason, including, but not limited to, if 
we reasonably believe: (i) you have violated these Terms or the Twitter Rules, 
(ii) you create risk or possible legal exposure for us; or (iii) our provision of the 
Services to you is no longer commercially viable. We will make reasonable 
efforts to notify you by the email address associated with your account or the 
next time you attempt to access your account. 
In all such cases, the Terms shall terminate, including, without limitation, your 
license to use the Services, except that the following sections shall continue to 
apply: 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 12. 
Nothing in this section shall affect Twitter’s rights to change, limit or stop the 
provision of the Services without prior notice, as provided above in section 1. 
Google We are constantly changing and improving our Services. We may add or remove 
functionalities or features, and we may suspend or stop a Service altogether.  
You can stop using our Services at any time, although we’ll be sorry to see you 
go. Google may also stop providing Services to you, or add or create new limits 
to our Services at any time.  
We believe that you own your data and preserving your access to such data is 
important. If we discontinue a Service, where reasonably possible, we will give 
you reasonable advance notice and a chance to get information out of that 
Service. 
Dropbox You're free to stop using our Services at any time. We also reserve the right to 
suspend or end the Services at any time at our discretion and without notice. For 
example, we may suspend or terminate your use of the Services if you're not 
complying with these Terms, or use the Services in a manner that would cause 
us legal liability, disrupt the Services or disrupt others' use of the Services. 
Except for Paid Accounts, we reserve the right to terminate and delete your 
account if you haven't accessed our Services for 12 consecutive months. We'll of 
course provide you with notice via the email address associated with your 
account before we do so. 
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Facebook WE TRY TO KEEP FACEBOOK UP, BUG-FREE, AND SAFE, BUT YOU 
USE IT AT YOUR OWN RISK. WE ARE PROVIDING FACEBOOK AS IS 
WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES INCLUDING, 
BUT NOT LIMITED TO, IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF 
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND 
NON-INFRINGEMENT. WE DO NOT GUARANTEE THAT FACEBOOK 
WILL ALWAYS BE SAFE, SECURE OR ERROR-FREE OR THAT 
FACEBOOK WILL ALWAYS FUNCTION WITHOUT DISRUPTIONS, 
DELAYS OR IMPERFECTIONS. FACEBOOK IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR 
THE ACTIONS, CONTENT, INFORMATION, OR DATA OF THIRD 
PARTIES, AND YOU RELEASE US, OUR DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, 
EMPLOYEES, AND AGENTS FROM ANY CLAIMS AND DAMAGES, 
KNOWN AND UNKNOWN, ARISING OUT OF OR IN ANY WAY 
CONNECTED WITH ANY CLAIM YOU HAVE AGAINST ANY SUCH 
THIRD PARTIES. 
Twitter Your access to and use of the Services or any Content are at your own risk. You 
understand and agree that the Services are provided to you on an "AS IS" and 
"AS AVAILABLE" basis. Without limiting the foregoing, to the maximum 
extent permitted under applicable law, THE TWITTER ENTITIES DISCLAIM 
ALL WARRANTIES AND CONDITIONS, WHETHER EXPRESS OR 
IMPLIED, OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE, OR NON-INFRINGEMENT. 
The Twitter Entities make no warranty or representation and disclaim all 
responsibility and liability for: (i) the completeness, accuracy, availability, 
timeliness, security or reliability of the Services or any Content; (ii) any harm to 
your computer system, loss of data, or other harm that results from your access 
to or use of the Services or any Content; (iii) the deletion of, or the failure to 
store or to transmit, any Content and other communications maintained by the 
Services; and (iv) whether the Services will meet your requirements or be 
available on an uninterrupted, secure, or error-free basis. No advice or 
information, whether oral or written, obtained from the Twitter Entities or 
through the Services, will create any warranty or representation not expressly 
made herein. 
Google We provide our Services using a commercially reasonable level of skill and care 
and we hope that you will enjoy using them. But there are certain things that we 
don’t promise about our Services. 
Other than as expressly set out in these terms or additional terms, neither Google 
nor its suppliers or distributors make any specific promises about the Services. 
For example, we don’t make any commitments about the content within the 
Services, the specific functions of the Services, or their reliability, availability, 
or ability to meet your needs. We provide the Services “as is”. 
Some jurisdictions provide for certain warranties, like the implied warranty of 
merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose and non-infringement. To the 
extent permitted by law, we exclude all warranties.  
Dropbox We strive to provide great Services, but there are certain things that we can't 
guarantee. TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, DROPBOX 
AND ITS AFFILIATES, SUPPLIERS AND DISTRIBUTORS MAKE NO 
WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ABOUT THE SERVICES. 
THE SERVICES ARE PROVIDED "AS IS." WE ALSO DISCLAIM ANY 
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. Some places don't allow the 
disclaimers in this paragraph, so they may not apply to you. 
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Facebook OUR AGGREGATE LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF THIS STATEMENT OR 
FACEBOOK WILL NOT EXCEED THE GREATER OF ONE HUNDRED 
DOLLARS ($100) OR THE AMOUNT YOU HAVE PAID US IN THE PAST 
TWELVE MONTHS. APPLICABLE LAW MAY NOT ALLOW THE 
LIMITATION OR EXCLUSION OF LIABILITY OR INCIDENTAL OR 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, SO THE ABOVE LIMITATION OR 
EXCLUSION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. IN SUCH CASES, FACEBOOK'S 
LIABILITY WILL BE LIMITED TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED 
BY APPLICABLE LAW. 
Twitter TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW, THE 
TWITTER ENTITIES SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY INDIRECT, 
INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES, 
OR ANY LOSS OF PROFITS OR REVENUES, WHETHER INCURRED 
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, OR ANY LOSS OF DATA, USE, GOOD-
WILL, OR OTHER INTANGIBLE LOSSES, RESULTING FROM (i) YOUR 
ACCESS TO OR USE OF OR INABILITY TO ACCESS OR USE THE 
SERVICES; (ii) ANY CONDUCT OR CONTENT OF ANY THIRD PARTY 
ON THE SERVICES, INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY 
DEFAMATORY, OFFENSIVE OR ILLEGAL CONDUCT OF OTHER 
USERS OR THIRD PARTIES; (iii) ANY CONTENT OBTAINED FROM THE 
SERVICES; OR (iv) UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS, USE OR ALTERATION 
OF YOUR TRANSMISSIONS OR CONTENT. 
IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AGGREGATE LIABILITY OF THE TWITTER 
ENTITIES EXCEED THE GREATER OF ONE HUNDRED U.S. DOLLARS 
(U.S. $100.00) OR THE AMOUNT YOU PAID TWITTER, IF ANY, IN THE 
PAST SIX MONTHS FOR THE SERVICES GIVING RISE TO THE CLAIM. 
THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS SUBSECTION SHALL APPLY TO ANY 
THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER BASED ON WARRANTY, 
CONTRACT, STATUTE, TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE) OR 
OTHERWISE, AND WHETHER OR NOT THE TWITTER ENTITIES HAVE 
BEEN INFORMED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY SUCH DAMAGE, AND 
EVEN IF A REMEDY SET FORTH HEREIN IS FOUND TO HAVE FAILED 
OF ITS ESSENTIAL PURPOSE. 
Google When permitted by law, Google, and Google’s suppliers and distributors, will 
not be responsible for lost profits, revenues, or data, financial losses or indirect, 
special, consequential, exemplary, or punitive damages. 
To the extent permitted by law, the total liability of Google, and its suppliers and 
distributors, for any claims under these terms, including for any implied 
warranties, is limited to the amount you paid us to use the Services (or, if we 
choose, to supplying you the Services again). 
In all cases, Google, and its suppliers and distributors, will not be liable for any 
loss or damage that is not reasonably foreseeable. 
We recognize that in some countries, you might have legal rights as a consumer. 
If you are using the Services for a personal purpose, then nothing in these terms 
or any additional terms limits any consumer legal rights which may not be 
waived by contract. 
Dropbox TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, EXCEPT FOR ANY 
LIABILITY FOR DROPBOX’S OR ITS AFFILIATES’ FRAUD, 
FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION, OR GROSS NEGLIGENCE, IN 
NO EVENT WILL DROPBOX, ITS AFFILIATES, SUPPLIERS OR 
DISTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR (A) ANY INDIRECT, SPECIAL, 
INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, EXEMPLARY OR CONSEQUENTIAL 
DAMAGES OR (B) ANY LOSS OF USE, DATA, BUSINESS, OR PROFITS, 
REGARDLESS OF LEGAL THEORY. THIS WILL BE REGARDLESS OF 
WHETHER OR NOT DROPBOX OR ANY OF ITS AFFILLIATES HAS 
BEEN WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES, AND EVEN 
IF A REMEDY FAILS OF ITS ESSENTIAL PURPOSE. ADDITIONALLY, 
DROPBOX, ITS AFFILIATES, SUPPLIERS AND DISTRIBUTORS WILL 
NOT BE LIABLE FOR AGGREGATE LIABILITY FOR ALL CLAIMS 
RELATING TO THE SERVICES MORE THAN THE GREATER OF $20 OR 
THE AMOUNTS PAID BY YOU TO DROPBOX FOR THE PAST 12 
MONTHS OF THE SERVICES IN QUESTION. Some places don't allow the 
types of limitations in this paragraph, so they may not apply to you. 
 
Table 6 
 
 
Facebook You will resolve any claim, cause of action or dispute (claim) you have with us 
arising out of or relating to this Statement or Facebook exclusively in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of California or a state court located in 
San Mateo County, and you agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction of such 
courts for the purpose of litigating all such claims. 
Twitter All claims, legal proceedings or litigation arising in connection with the Services 
will be brought solely in the federal or state courts located in San Francisco 
County, California, United States, and you consent to the jurisdiction of and 
venue in such courts and waive any objection as to inconvenient forum. 
Google Similarly, if the courts in your country will not permit you to consent to the 
jurisdiction and venue of the courts in Santa Clara County, California, U.S.A., 
then your local jurisdiction and venue will apply to such disputes related to these 
terms. Otherwise, all claims arising out of or relating to these terms or the 
services will be litigated exclusively in the federal or state courts of Santa Clara 
County, California, USA, and you and Google consent to personal jurisdiction in 
those courts. 
Dropbox You and Dropbox agree that any judicial proceeding to resolve claims relating to 
these Terms or the Services will be brought in the federal or state courts of San 
Francisco County, California, subject to the mandatory arbitration provisions 
below. Both you and Dropbox consent to venue and personal jurisdiction in such 
courts.  
 
  
Table 7 
 
 
Facebook The laws of the State of California will govern this Statement, as well as any 
claim that might arise between you and us, without regard to conflict of law 
provisions. 
Twitter These Terms and any action related thereto will be governed by the laws of the 
State of California without regard to or application of its conflict of law 
provisions or your state or country of residence. 
Google The courts in some countries will not apply California law to some types of 
disputes. If you reside in one of those countries, then where California law is 
excluded from applying, your country’s laws will apply to such disputes related 
to these terms. Otherwise, you agree that the laws of California, U.S.A., 
excluding California’s choice of law rules, will apply to any disputes arising out 
of or relating to these terms or the Services. 
Dropbox These Terms will be governed by California law except for its conflicts of laws 
principles, unless otherwise required by a mandatory law of any other 
jurisdiction. 
 
 
